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CHAPTER 1 
Domestic Relations 
MICHAEL WHEELER* 
A. CouRT DECISIONS 
§1.1. Divorce: Jurisdiction. In two cases argued together, 
Fiorentino v. Probate Court and Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered the constitutionality of statutory provisions 
requiring that in certain cases a person be a resident of Massachusetts 
for two years before he or she may file a libel for divorce. 2 The 
Court acknowledged that the Commonwealth has a substantial and 
compelling interest "in protecting its courts from fraudulent invoca-
tions of their jurisdiction,"3 but concluded that, because less drastic 
means are available to serve this interest, the two-year residence re-
quirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.4 Fiorentino appears to have been nullified by the United 
States Supreme Court, however. In January, 1975 in Sosna v. Iowa, 5 
the Court upheld as constitutional a similar, one-year residence 
requirement. 6 
§1.2. Divorce: Grounds. Lynch v. Lynch 1 involved an appeal from 
a probate court decree dismissing a libel for divorce brought on the 
grounds of cruel and abusive treatment and desertion. The parties 
had been married for fifty years but had not lived together since 
1931. At the hearing, the husband, who was seeking the divorce, al-
leged two instances in which his wife was verbally abusive. 2 His wife, 
* MICHAEL WHEELER is an Associate Professor of Law at New England School of Law 
and the author of No-Fault Divorce (1974). The author gratefully acknowledges the as-
sistance of Helen Haskell Stewart in preparing this chapter. 
§1.1. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 403,310 N.E.2d 112. 
2 G.L. c. 208, §§ 4-5. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 409, 310 N.E.2d at 117. 
4 Id. at 407-08, 310 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
5 
-U.S.-, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975), aff'g 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
6 95 S. Ct. at 563. 
§1.2. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 701, 304 N.E.2d 445. 
2 Id. at 701-02, 304 N.E.2d at 446. The court stated that the incidents involved 
merely an "exchange of epithets" in one instance and the wife's labeling of the husband 
as "a faker" in the other. In the second instance, however, the insult occurred in a 
courtroom, when the wife claimed that her husband was faking illness to avoid paying 
support. Id. 
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who stood to lose potential Social Security benefits if the marriage 
were terminated, contested the divorce, claiming the instances de-
scribed were not sufficient to constitute cruel and abusive treatment. 
The probate judge agreed and dismissed the libel. 3 
The Appeals Court noted that although verbal abuse may some-
times be cruel enough to warrant divorce,4 an examiination of the re-
port of material facts of Lynch did "not as a matteri of law require a 
different decree from that which had been enter~d."5 The case is 
noteworthy for two reasons. First, the court again at£:firmed the prin-
ciple of granting probate judges broad discretion in ~etermining what 
conduct does or does not constitute cruel and abusive treatment, and 
hence what kind of marital misconduct calls for divorce. Although 
appellate courts may be increasingly willing to affirm the granting of 
divorce on a minimal showing of cruelty,6 the Lynch decision demon-
strates that they have yet to declare that a minimal showing compels 
divorce. Until such a declaration is made, individual probate judges 
apparently may continue to apply somewhat strictdr standards than 
those established in the 1973 Ober v. Ober decision. 7 I 
Second, apparently neither the probate judge inor the Appeals 
Court was swayed by the fact that the parties had ~(tot lived together 
for more than four decades. In approximately hal~ the states - in-
cluding all but one of those contiguous to Massachusetts - "living 
apart" for a period of time is a statutory ground for divorce. 8 It un-
doubtedly would have been an encroachment on the legislative func-
tion for the court here to declare that the long separation in itself jus-
tified divorce. The court could have taken, either expressly or tacitly, 
the position that acts which might not be regarded as cruel and abu-
sive in marriages which show some countervailing signs of life must 
nevertheless be regarded as grounds for divorce ~hen the parties 
have lived apart over an extended period of time. 1fhat the court did 
not do so indicates that judicial loosening of the gro~nds has come as 
far as it will, and that if further revision is in order, lthat responsibility 
must lie with the legislature. I 
§1.3. Divorce: Apportionment of joint property. In D'Amico v. 
D'Amico, 1 the divorce proceedings included a petition by the husband 
3 Id. at 702, 304 N.E.2d at 446. 
4 See Ober v. Ober, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 33,294 N.E.2,d 449. 
5 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 702, 304 N.E.2d at 447. ~ 
6 See Ober v. Ober, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 33, 294 N.E.2Id 449. 
7 Id. The court sustained the divorce awarded on grounds pf cruel and abusive 
treatment where the wife made baseless accusations of infidelity. fd. at 36, 294 N.E.2d 
at 451. : 
8 The required period of living apart varies greatly. In Vermo~t it is six months; in 
Rhode Island it is five years. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 551 (Cum. S)lpp. 1972); R.I. Gen. 
Laws Ann. § 15-5-3 (Supp. 1973). New Hampshire does not have a "separation" 
ground, but does allow divorce if there are "irreconcilable differences". N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann.§ 458:7-a (Supp. 1973). 
§1.3. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 669, 303 N.E.2d 737. 
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for determination of title to certain joint bank accounts. The accounts 
had been funded with deposits from the earnings of both the hus-
band and wife; withdrawals were made periodically to pay for the 
parties' living expenses. The probate judge decreed, in effect, that the 
remaining balance in the accounts should be divided between the 
husband and wife in proportion to their respective contributions.2 
The wife objected to this division and appealed, contending that be-
cause her husband owed her a duty of support, all the withdrawals 
for mutual living expenses should be regarded as having been paid 
entirely from his contributions to the accounts. By attributing all the 
withdrawals to the husband's contributions, the resulting formula 
would have the effect of greatly increasing the wife's share of the re-
maining balance. 
The Appeals Court rejected her contentions and affirmed the de-
cree. "We agree that such a duty [to support one's wife] will ordinarily 
be imposed on a husband, but this is not invariably the case. Where, 
as here, the wife was at all times gainfully employed, the living ex-
penses can be and often are shared by intention of the parties."3 Not-
ing that the wife had endorsed her pay checks to her husband and 
that their funds had been commingled, the court ruled that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the probate judge's finding that the 
parties intended to share the responsibility for living expenses. 4 
Although D'Amico by no means abolishes a husband's traditional 
duty to support his wife, it does seem to reveal a judicial willingness to 
construe that duty narrowly, at least where both spouses are wage 
earners. Although no explicit agreement to modify the scope of the 
husband's duty to support was proven, the court was willing to imply 
such an agreement from the parties' conduct. In light of changing sex 
roles and growing employment opportunities for women, such a con-
clusion may be just. Before determining that a couple has intended to 
share responsibility for support, however, courts should consider not 
only whether funds have been commingled, but whether the spouses 
shared responsibility for the management and use of their pooled re-
sources. 
§ 1.4. Tenancy by the entirety: Constitutional challenge. In Klein 
v. Mayo 1 the plaintiff and her estranged husband owned their marital 
home as tenants by the entirety. She commenced an action in federal 
district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that 
the operation of the Massachusetts statute governing the partition of 
certain mutually held property2 deprived her of the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Since probate 
judges have exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for partition of 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 670, 303 N.E.2d at 738. 
4 Id. at 671, 303 N.E.2d at 738. 
§ 1.4. 1 367 F. Supp. 583 (D. Mass. 1973). 
2 G.L. c. 241, §§ 1 et seq. 
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property, 3 they were named defendants in the action. 4 
The controverted portion of the statute provides that "[a]ny person, 
except a tenant by the entirety, owning a present gndivided legal es-
tate in land, not subject to redemption, shall be en itled to have parti-
tion in the manner hereinafter provided."5 The laintiff contended 
that this provision reflects the notion, false in her view, that men are 
more capable than women in managing jointly held property. As a 
consequence, she argued that "the statute invidiously discriminates 
against women in that they are not entitled to a pattition of the jointly 
held premises as long as the marital relation endurfs."6 
The United States Supreme Court has closely scrutinized statutes 
which make classifications based on sex, 7 but the partition statute here 
makes no such classification, at least on its face. Neither wives nor 
husbands may obtain partition of property held ir. a tenancy by the 
entirety. The court rested its decision on this po-nt and accordingly 
entered judgment for the defendants. 8 I 
The court did acknowledge, however, that the nature of a tenancy 
by the entirety favors males in that husbands are entitled to exclusive 
possession of property so held, as well as all rents and profits that 
such property produces. Married couples have the alternatives of 
owning property solely, as tenants in common, or s joint tenants, but 
a tenancy by the entirety offers certain unique feat res. The court ob-
served that a "wife who wants the security of indefeasible survivorship 
can achieve it only by means of a male-dominated tenancy."9 The 
court further noted, "There is no equivalent fe~ale-biased tenancy, 
nor is there a 'neutral' married persons' tenancy fcroviding for inde-
feasible survivorship but not vesting paramount li etime rights in the 
male."10 
Since the Klein case did not squarely raise the issue of whether a 
tenancy by the entirety might in some larger sen~ violate the equal 
protection rights of married women, the court wa careful not to de-
cide that question. It did, however, offer some gr unds which might 
be raised as a defense in the event a constitutio al attack could be 
properly framed. "We are mindful as well that such a challenge may 
or may not be met by the fact that tenancy by the entirety is but one 
option open to married persons, and is in no war compelled by the 
3 G.L. c. 241, § 2. 
4 The court also ordered the plaintiffs husband to be joined as a party defendant, 
but he did not respond to the amended complaint. 367 F. Supp. at 586 n.4. 
5 G.L. c. 241, § I. 
6 367 F. Supp. at 584. In the event of divorce, a tenancy b~ the entirety terminates 
and the parties become tenants in common. : 
7 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 4ll U.S. 677, 688 (1973); but see Kahn v. She-
vin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). l 
8 367 F. Supp. at 586. 
9 Id. at 585. 
10 Id. These same ends might be accomplished through the use of a trust, however. 
I 
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state."11 Whether this argument alone would provide sufficient basis 
for upholding tenancies by the entirety may be open to question, but 
the Supreme Court has seemed somewhat reluctant to strike down 
state laws on equal protection grounds when those laws affect land 
title and the passage of property on death. 12 
§1.5. Abortion: Paternal rights. In Doe v. Doe 1 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court confronted the question of what legal rights, if any, a 
husband has with respect to his wife's decision to have an abortion. 
This section will concentrate on the domestic relations aspects of the 
case; the constitutional issues are discussed at length in a student 
comment in §10.8 infra. In Doe the husband sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against his wife when she planned to have an abor-
tion despite his objection. A single justice of the Court ordered the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the fetus and granted the 
husband temporary relief restraining the wife from procuring an 
abortion, pending a hearing before the full bench. 2 
The majority of the Court ordered entry of a decree that an abor-
tion might be performed on the wife without the consent of her hus-
band. In an opinion handed down several months later, the Court 
explained its ruling. It noted both that this particular couple had 
separated some time before proceedings had begun and that there 
was evidence that the husband had told his wife he did not want to 
support the child or have his name appear on its birth certificate. Ap-
parently the husband's purported indifference to his unborn child 
prompted his wife's decision to have an abortion, but after learning of 
her intentions the husband stated his objections and asserted his will-
ingness to support the child and take custody of it. 3 
Although the Court took care to recite these facts, it did not limit its 
holdings to circumstances where the husband and wife are estranged. 
Instead, it scrutinized constitutional, statutory and common law for 
support for the petitioner's contention that all fathers have enforce-
able rights in the abortion decision and found none. It recognized a 
line of Supreme Court cases establishing that certain interests as-
sociated with the marital relationship give rise to rights guaranteed by 
the federal Constitution,4 but distinguished them on the ground that 
"all those cases involved a shield for the private citizen against gov-
ernment action, not a sword of government assistance to enable him 
to overturn the private decisions of his fellow citizens."5 
11 Id. at 586. 
12 The Supreme Court in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972), 
distinguished Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), on this basis. 
§1.5. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1089, 314 N.E.2d 128. 
2 Id. at 1090, 314 N.E.2d at 129. 
3 Id. 
4 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
5 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1093, 314 N.E.2d at 130. 
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Finding no Massachusetts statute to support the husband's claim, 
the Court also noted that the efforts of some stat~ legislatures to re-
quire consent on the part of husbands have not }vithstood constitu-
tional attack. 6 The Court concluded that even "[i]f it is within our 
power, free of constitutional prohibition, to fashion a rule of decision 
recognizing an enforceable right in the husband, we decline to do so, 
at least where the fetus is not viable." 7 I 
The Court professed to have jurisdiction to determine the substance 
of the claim, at least to the extent of being able to ~=ant declaratory, if 
not injunctive, relief. Yet in essence, the Court'~ dismissal of the 
husband's bill seems ultimately to be based on jurisdictional considera-
tions. 
We would not order either a husband or a wife to do what is 
necessary to conceive a child or to prevent conception, any more 
than we would order either party to do what is necessary to 
make the other happy. We think the same considerations pre-
vent us from forbidding the wife to do what is necessary to 
bring about or to prevent birth, at least before thf fetus is viable 
and in the absence of any danger to maternal life or health. 
Some things must be left to private agreement. 8 , 
In recognizing the limits of judicial power in sudh sensitive matters 
- and in particular, the ineffectiveness of possible sanctions - the 
Court recalled that even when most abortions were prohibited by 
criminal statutes, women who obtained them were r.ot punished. The 
Court also expressed a fear that injunctions or other such sanctions 
might "drive determined women into the waiting offices of persons 
not licensed."9 It might also have been noted that ir a woman wished, 
she might well be able to conceal a pregnancy and! abortion from her 
husband. Granting husbands enforceable rights might thus lead to the 
ironic result that a wife could be dissuaded from even informing her 
husband of her condition. • 
In short, the Court's decision appears to rest at le'ast as much on the 
proposition that it would be impractical to establish an enforceable 
right in favor of the husband as it does on a woman's right of privacy 
as set forth in Roe v. Wade. 10 Dissenting in part, jJustice Hennessey 
agreed that the Court should not grant an injunc~ion as it would be 
"unseemly, almost unthinkable" to imprison a woman for contempt 
for having a legal abortion.U Nevertheless, he argued that if only "for 
the moral force of the pronouncement," the Court $hould declare that 
"the wife has a duty in these circumstances to refrain from any inten-
6 Id. at 1094, 314 N.E.2d at 131. 
7 Id. at 1096, 314 N.E.2d at 132. 
8 Id. (emphasis added). 
9 Id. 
10 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
11 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1100,314 N.E.2d at 134. 
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tional interference, by herself or by cooperation with others, with the 
progress of her pregnancy to full term and birth."12 
The Court in Doe clearly ruled that regardless of a father's wishes, it 
would not interfere in a woman's abortion decision, except to protect 
maternal health, until the fetus is viable. 13 It also strongly suggested 
that it would not interfere in situations where spouses disagree on the 
practice of birth control. It did, however, leave some important ques-
tions unresolved. What effect, for example, does a wife's unilateral 
decision to have an abortion have on the status of her marriage? Such 
a decision might not be considered "cruel" in the narrow sense of 
being intended to inflict pain upon a husband, but it might well be 
regarded as much more threatening to a marital relationship than a 
thrown frying pan or even an isolated act of adultery. 
Should then the courts or legislature grant a divorce to a husband 
whose wife has had an abortion over his objections? Several problems 
might arise in doing so. First, if the divorce system is to be truly 
fault-based, it is difficult to conceive of this legal act by the wife as 
being a wrong against the husband, though it might be viewed as a 
wrong against the marriage. Second, if her action could be seen as 
marital misconduct, should it be considered as a factor detrimental to 
her in the determination of financial and custodial issues? Third, 
since it would be difficult to determine the legitimacy of a husband's 
objections to the abortion, opponents of "easy divorce" might fear that 
a couple could fabricate grounds. Given the ease with which uncon-
tested divorces can be obtained on the ground of cruel and abusive 
treatment, however, this does not seem to be a significant problem. 
Finally, if a husband were permitted to divorce a wife who gets an 
abortion over his objection, should he also be able to obtain a divorce 
if he does not approve of his wife's practice of birth control? Simi-
larly, what should be the outcome where the roles are reversed, i.e., 
where the husband insists on abortion or contraception but the wife 
refuses? 
The Court in Doe refused to resolve these issues. "Nothing we say 
here is intended to affirm or deny a right in the husband to divorce, 
separation, child custody, or the like by reason of an abortion pro-
cured by his wife without his consent." 14 It is likely, however, that 
these issues will soon have to be confronted by the courts and the 
legislature. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§1.6. Divorce: Desertion. Chapter 358 of the Acts of 1974 has 
reduced the minimum length of time necessary to establish desertion 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1096, 314 N.E.2d at 132. 
14 Id. at 1097, 314 N.E.2d at 133. 
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as a ground for divorce from two years to one. 1 Itiis still necessary to 
prove utter desertion, i.e., that the libellee left \\(ithout justification 
and without the libellant's consent.2 The statute ijas been amended, 
however, to provide that "[a] libel for divorce for !desertion shall not 
be defeated by a temporary return or other act of the libellee if the 
court finds that such return or other act was noi made or done in 
good faith, but with intent to defeat such libel."3 I 
§1.7. Divorce: Alimony. Chapter 565 of the !Acts of 1974 sub-
stantially expands the probate court's power to ord~r alimony and the 
conveyance of property on divorce. It also sets ~lrth in some detail 
the criteria the court should apply in making such rders. 
The previous law simply stated that "the court ay decree alimony 
to the wife, or a part of her estate, in the nature; of alimony, to the 
husband." 1 The new section provides that "the coutt may order either 
of the parties to pay alimony to the other."2 Thus, for the first time in 
Massachusetts, a woman may be compelled to PfY periodic, as op-
posed to lump-sum, alimony to a former husband! Judging from the 
experiences of other states with similar provisions, I this is not likely to 
be a frequent occurrence.3 Nevertheless, it reflects Ia general trend on 
the part of legislatures and courts to require wom~n to assume great-
er financial responsibilities both during and after marriage. 
The new section also provides that "[i]n additioato or in lieu of an 
order to pay alimony, the court may assign to eit er the husband or 
wife all or any part of the estate of the other."4 nder existing stat-
utes the probate court had some equitable powed to order the con-
veyance of real property in divorce proceedings; 5 ~he new section ap-
parently expands the power of the court since the phrase "any part of 
the estate of the other" seems to encompass persoral, as well as real, 
property of both the husband and wife. , 
Alimony has traditionally been considered an I allowance for the 
support of a dependent former spouse, 6 and not asl a device for divid-
ing property. 7 The prior law permitted the court !to order a wife to 
convey "a part of her estate, in the nature or alimony, to the 
husband."8 The new section not only permits the issuance of such an 
order against the husband, but also removes the tequirement that it 
be "in the nature of alimony." Indeed, it specifiFally provides that 
§ 1.6. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 358, § 1. 
2 Acts of 1974, c. 358, § 2. 
3 Id. 
§1.7. 1 G.L. c. 208, § 34, repealed by Acts of 1974, c. 565. 
2 Acts of 1974, c. 565. 
3 See Wheeler, No-Fault Divorce 60-61 (1974). 
4 Acts of 1974, c. 565. 
5 See, e.g., G.L. c. 183, §§ 43-44 and c. 208, § 34A. 
6 See Brown v. Brown, 222 Mass. 415, Ill N.E. 42 (1916). i 
7 See Ober v. Ober, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 33, 294 N.E.I2d 449. 
8 G.L. c. 208, § 34, repealed by Acts of 1974, c. 565. ! 
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such orders may be made "in lieu of alimony."9 As a result, section 34 
may be construed to authorize awards differing in both amount and 
nature from mere support payments for a dependent former spouse. 
Some proponents of divorce reform feel that alimony awards can be 
both arbitrary and excessive, and hence favor the adoption of more 
specific standards for the determination of alimony. Under the new 
section, courts are instructed to "consider the length of the marriage, 
the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, sta-
tion, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties and the 
opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and 
income."10 In addition, the court may consider the contribution of 
each of the parties to his or her respective estate.U Although the 
catalogue of considerations is relatively precise, it is not likely to re-
duce the probate court's broad discretion in fixing alimony, primarily 
because no specific weights are assigned to any of the factors. Em-
phasis on one consideration, such as length of marriage, might justify 
a generous award, while reliance on a different factor, such as the 
parties' conduct, might support a contrary result. In short, it will re-
main difficult to establish on appeal that a probate judge's determina-
tion of alimony is plainly wrong. 
§1.8. Child abuse. Chapter 1076 of the Acts of 1973 represents a 
sweeping revision of earlier statutes governing the reporting of child 
abuse. Sections 39A-C of chapter 119 have been repealed and sections 
SlA-G have been substituted. 1 In addition to the physicians, medical 
interns, social workers, and school officials who were previously re-
quired to report suspected instances of child abuse, the new section 
51A also requires dentists, nurses, family counselors and police to file 
such reports. 2 Lawyers are not required to report child abuse, but the 
statute permits anyone who has learned of such a problem to report 
it. The prior law did not precisely define child abuse, whereas the 
new statute specifies a variety of situations which can lead to physical 
or emotional injury. 3 
As under the old law, those who are required to report child abuse 
to the Department of Public Welfare are not subject to any statutory 
penalties if they fail to do so. It is possible, however, that such a fail-
ure which leads to further injury of a child might be the basis of a 
private action in tort. Some commentators believe that not all people 
who observe signs of child abuse report them, possibly out of fear of 
retaliatory libel actions by the parents. To overcome this, section 51 A 
9 Acts of 1974, c. 565. 
10 ld. 
II ld. 
§ 1.8. 1 Acts of 1973, c. 1076, §§ 5-6. 
2 Acts of 1973, c. 1076, § 5. 
3Jd. 
9
Sherry: Chapter 2: Labor Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1974
12 1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETJ1 LAW §1.10 
provides that any person required to report child abuse IS Immune 
from civil or criminal liability which might otherwise stem from filing 
a report; for such persons, the former requirement of good faith re-
porting has been eliminated. 4 The new sections also establish a 
number of procedures to facilitate temporary custody in emergency 
situations; other provisions more clearly delineatF the powers and 
duties of the Department.5 The law additionally provides for the cre-
ation of a central registry to collect and coordi ate data received 
through the new reporting procedures. 6 This las feature may con-
cern those who fear governmental encroachments ~n privacy. 
C. PROBATE RuLES AND PRACTICES 
§1.9. Probate rules. Probate Rule 49, which went into effect in 
1974, requires parties in divorce or separate support proceedings who 
are either requesting alimony or support or seekin a modification of 
such an order to file a sworn financial statement. I a contested pro-
ceeding either party may request the other to pro uce such a state-
ment. Probate judges may require new statements during the course 
of proceedings. 1 These financial statements will be ept separate from 
other court papers and will not be available to the g neral public. 
Most judges in Middlesex County are now refusing to order hus-
bands to pay their wives' attorneys fees under Probate Rule 47,2 on 
the apparent ground that the failure of the rule to provide a similar 
remedy for financially handicapped husbands makes operation of the 
rule violative of the equal protection rights of men. In view of the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Kahn v. Shevi , 3 this conclusion 
may be erroneous. In Kahn the Court upheld the c nstitutionality of a 
Florida statute giving widows a special property x exemption not 
available to widowers. The Court ruled that sex classification was 
permissible in that instance in light of the state's p rpose of lessening 
"the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex or whom that loss 
imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."4 It would seem likely 
that Rule 4 7 could be upheld on similar reasoning, but the issue has 
not yet been considered by a higher court. 
§1.10. Probate practices. A committee appointed by the Chief 
Judge of Probate has promulgated more than a dozen new "uniform 
practices" which have gone into effect in all the prfbate courts in the 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
I § 1.9. 1 The rule does not specify any sanction for those who' fail to file a required 
statement, though anyone who refuses to comply clearly risks displeasing the court. 
2 As an alternative, attorneys for either the wife or the husband may attempt to pro-
cure fees under G.L. c. 208, § 38. 
3 416 u.s. 351 (1974). 
4 Id. at 355. 
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Commonwealth. Because the practices are not Rules, they do not need 
the approval of the Supreme Judicial Court. Yet although these prac-
tices are in theory less formal than court rules (which are in the pro-
cess of being redrafted), they have significantly altered probate pro-
ceedings. For example, Practice II eliminates the need for corroborat-
ing witnesses in almost all uncontested divorces. While this previously 
was the case in some courts, it is now the practice in all the probate 
courts. Establishing consistent practices in the probate courts is ex-
pected to facilitate the tasks of both lawyers and court officials. 
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